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Abstract  12 
The monetary valuation of ecosystem services is gaining significant traction in policy and 13 
business communities. Several tools and decision making processes have been proposed 14 
including criteria such as scale, uniqueness and threat for when such monetary valuation 15 
should be used for the purpose of biodiversity conservation. This paper uses case studies 16 
of monetisation projects where the outcomes have been measured, at least to some 17 
extent, to explore the limitations and application of these criteria. It concludes that while 18 
there may be some aspects of monetisation that could be beneficial for biodiversity 19 
conservation there is currently limited evidence of the effectiveness of such schemes and 20 
indeed the majority are being applied in areas where the criteria would specifically exclude 21 
its use in isolation and require some quantitative minimum (or maximum) measurements 22 
to be applied through additional policy or governance measures.   23 
 24 
 25 
  26 
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Introduction  1 
Traditionally tools to assess the effectiveness of biodiversity conservation policies focus 2 
on the ecological aspects of policy compliance, such as environmental impact assessment 3 
for habitat loss (Gontier et al., 2006) and biodiversity assessment tools (Hayek & Buzas, 4 
2010). However, due to the increasing importance of sustainability principles in nature 5 
conservation, it is now widely recognised that any tool used in decision-making processes 6 
should also take into consideration aspects of economic development and social equity. 7 
While many argue that the use of valuation may alienate some stakeholders, is not able 8 
to fully reconcile cultural, economic, social and environmental justice (Matulis, 2014; Tallis 9 
& Lubchenco, 2014), and that any such approach is always going to be complex and 10 
involve conflicts (Pascual et al., 2017; Kenter, 2016), the role of ecosystem services as 11 
‘the benefits that people derive from ecosystems’ (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 12 
2005), and how these can be valued, has become an integral part of decision making 13 
(Costanza et al, 2017; Costanza et al., 1997; Adams, 2014). 14 
 15 
Tools for economic valuation of natural resources were first applied in the 1980s (Pagiola, 16 
2008; Mitchell & Carsons, 1989) and several frameworks have been developed since then 17 
in order to conduct valuations of ecosystems (Bagstad et al., 2013, Costanza et al., 2017). 18 
A main benefit from the application of such techniques is that they improve and facilitate 19 
discussions on biodiversity conservation both at the scientific and policy level (Millennium 20 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Kallis et al., 2013; Ruckelshaus et al., 2015). This is 21 
because they allow environmental contributions, and the consequences of their 22 
preservation, loss or restoration, to be expressed in terms that are comparable to other 23 
aspects relevant to land use choices (Randall, 2002; Hanley and Shogren, 2002).  24 
 25 
Despite the wide development of valuation studies (Costanza et al., 2017) there are 26 
several concerns regarding their applicability and challenges have been identified 27 
(Adams, 2014). Interdependent ecosystems and ecosystem services are difficult to value 28 
in monetary terms (Gómez- Baggethun & Ruiz-Pérez, 2011; Vatn & Bromley, 1994) or to 29 
value separately due to their inherent complexity (Martín-López et al., 2008, Rodriguez et 30 
al., 2006). Equally, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the role and importance of 31 
specific parts of ecosystems and their functions (Farley, 2008). Here uncertainty 32 
characterizes the unknown probabilities of possible outcomes and is to be distinguished 33 
from risk which describes known probabilities of possible outcomes.  34 
 35 
Valuations often rely on problematic economic assumptions implying normative 36 
judgments (Abson & Termanson, 2010). Markets often weight preferences by purchasing 37 
power (Farley et al., 2015) and are influenced by the power structures within and between 38 
the institutions in which they are made (Vatn & Bromley, 1994, Martinez-Alier & O'Connor, 39 
2002; Røpke, 2005).  Similarly, local scale studies are influenced by individual 40 
characteristics and perceptions such as the level of place attachment (Garcia-Llorente et 41 
al., 2012; Lopez-Mosquera & Sanchez, 2013) and personal environmental values (Spash 42 
et al., 2009; Lopez-Mosquera & Sanchez, 2012). In this context, some argue for a plural 43 
valuation approach, referring to the consideration of not only monetary values, but also 44 
ecological, social and cultural values (Kumar, 2010; de Groot et al., 2006; Farley, 2012; 45 
Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; Norgaard, 2010). However, there is some evidence that any 46 
attempt at valuation may in fact adversely impact pro-environmental behaviours through 47 
the reduction in the intrinsic value of nature (Goff et al., 2017).  48 
 49 
Several authors have proposed certain conditions under which valuation studies can be 50 
useful especially on a policy level for nature conservation. Kallis et al. (2013) propose four 51 
criteria regarding the outcomes of monetary valuation as guidance for the decision on 52 
whether to value nature or not. These are summarised in Table 1. While additionality is 53 
an objective criterion, with the last three Kallis et al. (2013) apply also normative criteria. 54 
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Table 1: Four criteria for monetary valuation as proposed by Kallis et al. (2013).  2 
Criteria  Definition  
additionality This refers to whether the valuation being implemented 
improves the ecological conditions of the ecosystem compared 
to the situation before and is additional to any other 
interventions that are in place 
equality More precisely, whether the valuation reduces inequality in the 
population who depend on the ecosystem 
complexity-
blinding 
This implies that the valuation applied does not allow for other 
ways of valuation and other institutions to participate in the 
valuation 
accumulation by 
dispossession 
This refers to whether the valuation promotes expropriation of 
public goods. 
 3 
 4 
 5 
Other normative criteria that need to be taken into consideration include whether an 6 
ecosystem is publicly or privately managed (Lockie, 2013) and  the source of funding for 7 
any ecosystem valuation  (Mokhiber, 1999). Objective criteria that are discussed in the 8 
literature include the specific ecological conditions, the level of substitutability of the 9 
ecosystem (Turner et al., 2003; Ekins et al., 2003) and also the level of ecological 10 
resilience (Brand, 2009). There is also a debate regarding the scale that these 11 
measurements should take place with some authors being more in favour of local 12 
measurements (Ninan & Inoue, 2013; Turner et al., 2003) as they are more focused and 13 
adjustable to the conditions of the ecosystem in contrast to large-scale programs (Wunder 14 
et al., 2008). At the global scale, ecosystem assessments have shown that a number of 15 
important thresholds have already been passed (Rockstrom et al., 2009).In the context of 16 
this debate, Turner et al. (2003) have proposed that the ability of ecosystems to be valued 17 
depends significantly on the scale of change. Small-scale changes, for example the loss 18 
of a local forest, can be meaningfully valued whereas global, large-scale changes may 19 
entail too severe consequences for human life, or are not feasible or substitutable, to be 20 
meaningfully valued. This argument is depicted as a demand curve for the flow of 21 
ecosystem services. If the provision of ecosystem services falls below a critical threshold, 22 
then it is no longer possible to value it meaningfully as further losses of this service would 23 
have too severe consequences. Defining which change is marginal is in itself one of the 24 
main challenges of valuation. In small-scale valuation studies considering a 25 
comprehensive set of ecosystem functions and uses, Turner et al. (2003) demonstrate, 26 
that valuation can indeed show that conservation in comparison to conversion is 27 
economically more beneficial. Taking this argument a step further, Farley (2008) 28 
integrates the concept of critical natural capital (Ekins et al., 2003), which is not 29 
substitutable and essential to human life, into this framework. He proposes three regions 30 
for the state of critical natural capital or the provision of essential ecosystem services. 31 
Abundant and resilient stocks of critical natural capital are appropriate to be valued. 32 
Stocks of natural capital closer to a critical threshold become inappropriate to be valued 33 
because of increasing uncertainties and their growing marginal importance (Fig. 1).  34 
 35 
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Figure 1: A conceptual framework for the valuation of natural capital stocks (adopted from 2 
Farley, 2008 and Turner et al., 2003) 3 
 4 
Farley (2008) agrees with Turner et al. (2003) that valuation can, at least theoretically, 5 
support informing the decision to what degree ecosystems should be conserved but he 6 
mentions that in reality the market fails to allocate environmental goods. Especially at the 7 
state of the global ecosystem, which is not far from thresholds, valuation can no longer be 8 
applicable as a solution for the macro-allocation problem.  9 
 10 
Daly (2007) suggests prices should adjust to the demand regulated by conservation, and 11 
not the other way around. When these minimum requirements are met, an eventual 12 
surplus may be converted to economic production. Here, valuation might actually be 13 
helpful to achieve these conservation requirements in the most cost-efficient way (Farley, 14 
2008) and also to raise attention to the problem (Costanza et al., 1997).  15 
 16 
As highlighted above, significant emphasis has been given to the design of valuation 17 
studies. However, the analysis reveals that the conditions of the ecosystem being valued 18 
are equally crucial in order to understand whether ecosystem valuation can be applied in 19 
an effective and meaningful way.  20 
 21 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to analyse what theory suggests as appropriate to be 22 
valued through monetisation and examine whether evidence can be found in the actual 23 
implementation of valuation studies in line with what theory suggests.  24 
 25 
In the next section we outline the methodology behind the choice of case studies that have 26 
been examined in this paper. The case studies are then presented against three 27 
categories of monetisation. We then discuss the findings from the case studies and 28 
explore the criteria against which the applicability of monetisation for ecosystem 29 
conservation can be judged. Finally we draw some brief conclusions underlining new 30 
directions for research.  31 
 32 
Methods  33 
For this paper, a sample of case studies were chosen. Each case study needed to include a 34 
valuation method, and have ecosystems that had been directly affected or an impact on 35 
ecosystems was imminent. In addition, case studies needed to include evaluations of their 36 
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environmental effectiveness. Evaluations were prioritised if they were carried out 1 
independently to the organisation involved in the ecosystem payments. In comparison to 2 
valuation studies, case studies on the actual outcomes from the implementation of ecosystem 3 
service valuations are rare (Laurans et al., 2013).  4 
 5 
For the analysis we allocate each of these case studies against three common types of 6 
monetisation in use: Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), integrating ecosystem service 7 
valuation in cost-benefit analyses (CBA) and compensation payments for environmental 8 
damages. We define each as:  9 
 10 
 Payments for Ecosystem Services involve monetary exchange between two or more 11 
parties in order to prevent or lessen any damage to a particular ecosystem.  12 
 Cost-benefit analyses involves one party integrating a monetary value for a given 13 
ecosystem services into a decision making process to assess possible outcomes of 14 
different interventions or schemes. No monetary exchange takes place.   15 
 Compensation payments are made between two or more parties following pollution 16 
damage of ecosystems.  17 
 18 
 19 
When ecosystem service valuations are implemented in PES schemes, they are mostly 20 
approximated by the opportunity cost of providing the services rather than by their inherent 21 
value (Wunder et al., 2008). For CBA and compensation payments a variety of valuation 22 
methods are applied, including ‘benefit transfer’, which extrapolates valuation studies for other 23 
locations or times as approximation for the value of the ecosystem in question (Reid, 1999; 24 
Schmidt and Wittich, 2014; Turner et al., 2003), as well as ‘contingent valuation’ which 25 
examines the value people would pay to avoid the loss of a certain ecosystem service (i.e. 26 
Carson et al., 2003).  27 
 28 
The case studies are analysed against the criteria judging the appropriateness to be valued 29 
of the ecosystem. These criteria are deduced from Turner et al. (2003), who suggest that 30 
ecosystems that are not substitutable, for moral reasons, which adds a normative dimension 31 
to the otherwise rather objective criteria used here, or because their degradation would entail 32 
severe consequences for human survival, are not appropriate to be valued. This includes any 33 
ecosystem valuations of global scale. In contrast, ecosystems on a local scale with marginal, 34 
small changes in their condition can be valued meaningfully as long as they are not close to a 35 
threshold beyond which the existence of the ecosystem is threatened. If an ecosystem is close 36 
to a threshold their state is highly uncertain making it inappropriate to be valued (Farley, 2008). 37 
Accordingly, we define the criteria determining the appropriateness to be valued as scale of 38 
change, threat and uniqueness, the latter indicating the substitutability of the ecosystem. The 39 
criticality of the ecosystems valued is approximated by these criteria and a judgement on 40 
whether in practice the ecosystems are appropriate to be valued on theoretical grounds can 41 
be made. If the ecosystem does not fulfil one of the previously defined criteria, it should only 42 
be valued under restrictions. Based on this scheme, we can assign the case studies to the 43 
regions outlined by Farley (2008) or that by Turner et al. (2003) and seen in Fig. 1. We are 44 
aware that criticality can be the result of other than ecological characteristics, but we 45 
concentrate on ecological criticality.  46 
Results 47 
Table 2 summarises the case studies that were assessed, the type of ecosystem involved and 48 
the source of data on the evaluation of environmental effectiveness. The results summarise 49 
the different types of ecosystem service valuation in practice and highlight whether these were 50 
deemed to have had positive environmental outcomes or not. The case study results are then 51 
used to compare the specific outcomes with the theoretical proposals for the conditions under 52 
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which the use of such schemes are appropriate or not. The case studies span a large variety 1 
of geographic scales and are presented in chronological order starting with the oldest first.    2 
 3 
 4 
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Table 2: The case studies assessed and evaluated for this study.   
 
Project Country Year Ecosystem Valued ESS Finance source/ Valuation 
method 
Review 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
The 
Environmentally 
Sensitive Areas 
(ESA)/Countryside 
Stewardship 
Scheme (CSS) 
UK 1986/1991 historic landscapes biodiversity, recreation government-financed PES This an early example of agri-environmental PES programmes 
(Dobbs and Pretty, 2008). In the following years, it was 
complemented by various other PES programmes, one of which 
was the CSS, targeting farmland in England. Both were intended 
to protect naturally and historically valuable landscapes and 
habitats. Financed by the European Union (EU) and the UK 
government to similar shares, farmers received compensation 
payments to reduce agricultural intensity and to restore historic 
landscapes and features, such as stone walls and farm buildings 
(DEFRA, 2004, p. 12). By 2003, the CSS covered 530,620 hectares 
and the ESA 640,000 hectares in England, 10 % of agricultural 
land. However, the programmes failed to integrate a large 
amount of high-intensive agricultural lands or those areas that 
required larger changes in land-use and were more successful in 
preserving landscape (Potter, 1998). Various studies valuing the 
protection of the ESA programme, with the contingent valuation 
method, found the benefits to be much larger than their cost 
(Stewart et al., 1997). The CSS showed some additionality, 
mostly at the margin, according to interviews with the 
landowners and field surveys (Carey et al., 2003). It is noted that 
demonstrating real additionality, to be sure that the benefits are 
caused by the programme alone, is very difficult (Hanley et al., 
1999). After 2003, the programmes were replaced by a new 
policy package under EU’s Common Agricultural Policy building 
on what was learned in ESA and related programmes (Dobbs and 
Pretty, 2008). 
Communal Areas 
Management 
Programme for 
Indigenous 
Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) 
Zimbabwe 1989 grassland biodiversity, recreation hybrid PES The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe was started in 1989. It is 
financed by user fees of safari operators and external donations. 
The Rural District Councils (RDCs) manage the 4.3 million ha of 
communal land covered by the project and pay dividends to the 
farming communities as incentives to adopt land-uses less 
harmful to wildlife. The CAMPFIRE project was established as 
part of a process to promote commercial use of wildlife as an 
alternative for the communities to agricultural land use that 
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threatens wildlife populations. Environmental additionality 
could be achieved in terms of raised wildlife population and 
hunting revenues. However, a potential for ‘leakage’ exists and 
the success of the programme depends on the demand and 
market price for wildlife and landscape beauty, as well as on the 
relative abundance of wildlife in the respective area. (Frost and 
Bond, 2008). 
Vittel watershed 
protection 
programme 
France 1993 watershed/aquifer water provision user-financed PES This is a successful example where single users, in this case water 
bottlers, have initiated PES schemes in order to protect their 
water spring area that would been otherwise contaminated by 
agricultural land-use. They pay farmers to secure water quality 
through environmental friendly land-use. Private water bottler 
Vittel offers cash payments and technical assistance to farmers 
in the 5100 hectare area surrounding the water spring. 
Payments are managed by an intermediary agency and are 
based on the individual opportunity cost of farmers undertaking 
the necessary changes. The water quality is frequently 
monitored and clearly improved thanks to the PES programme 
(Perrot-Maître, 2006). 
PROFAFOR 
carbon-
sequestration 
programme. 
Ecuador 1993 forest carbon sequestration user-financed PES This programme is organised by the PROFAFOR corporation 
which has paid landowners for afforestation and reforestation 
activities since 1993 (Wunder & Alban, 2008). PROFAFOR’s 
financial source are Dutch electricity corporations that aim to 
offset their carbon emissions by buying carbon sequestration 
services from forests. The contracts are made with landowners 
of mostly highlands, but also in the coastal zone of Ecuador. 
22,306 hectares of trees were planted so far. Most of the 
contracts have a duration of one cropping cycle after which the 
landowners receive financial incentives to replant the trees but 
are not obliged to do so. In comparison to surrounding areas, 
the tree cover planted under the control of PROFAFOR is 
regarded to be additional. However, the planted non-native 
species may have adverse effects on ecosystem services such as 
carbon sequestration. 
Working for 
Water (WfW)  
South Africa 1995 watershed biodiversity, water 
provision 
government-financed PES In South Africa the invasion of alien vegetation had increased 
water scarcity. In water catchments in the Western Cape, the 
most affected area, 31 % of the total yearly water runoff are lost 
due to invasive species (Le Maitre et al., 2000). The programme 
Working for Water (WfW) was launched in 1995 with reducing 
unemployment rates as a primary objective. Previously 
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unemployed are employed to clear invasive plants, especially 
highly water-absorbing species. The workers’ salaries are 
conditional on their success. The programme is financed mainly 
by the government but also by water users, increasingly with 
water utilities that commission the programme to clear their 
catchment. Programme costs include not only the costs of 
clearing the invasive species but also social programmes such as 
health and training. The programme was successful in both 
objectives, reducing unemployment and securing native 
biodiversity and raised water provision (Turpie et al., 2008). 
Pago por Servicios 
Ambientales (PSA) 
 
 
Costa Rica 1997 forest hydrological services, gas 
sequestration, 
biodiversity, recreation 
hybrid PES The oldest PES system in developing countries, it was 
established for watershed protection. By the end of 2005, it 
covered 10% of the country’s forest area, in total 270,000 
hectares, which were chosen according to biodiversity, poverty 
and water criteria. The programme was built on already existing  
infrastructure for payments for reforestation that facilitated the 
introduction of the PSA, including forest law protecting certain 
ecosystem services that can be attained from forests, such as 
water services, greenhouse gas sequestration, biodiversity and 
recreation. This is a hybrid programme, as it is financed by 
ecosystem service users through contracts with corporations, 
such as hydrological power generators, and through earmarked 
water and fossil fuel taxes. Additionally, the programme 
received funds from international NGOs. As in many PES 
schemes, an intermediary agency manages the cash payments 
to landowners for the maintenance and afforestation of tropical 
forests (Pagiola, 2008). Evaluation studies on the effectiveness 
of this type of PES implementation are widely divided as to 
whether the programmes contributed to actual net forestation 
in the country. This is because the effect of the programme is 
difficult to separate from other interventions and the studies 
often do not include high threat areas (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., 
2007; Arriagada et al., 2012, Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008).    
Natural Forest 
Conservation 
Programme/ 
Grain to Green 
programme 
China 1998/1999 forest, grassland soil erosion control, 
carbon sequestration, 
biodiversity 
government-financed PES After the severe droughts and floods of 1997 and 1998, the 
Chinese government introduced several PES schemes for the 
protection and restoration of natural forests and grasslands. The 
NFCP includes a logging ban and compensation payments for 
corporate landowners as incentive to change their land-use 
from clearing the forest land to commercial forest management. 
Additionally, starting in 1999, the GTGP paid farmers cash and 
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in-kind payments, as seeds, to incentivise them to convert steep 
cropland to grassland or forests (Liu et al., 2008). Having 
converted or afforested 21 million hectares by 2006, the GTGP 
is the largest PES globally. Both programmes have shown 
positive impacts on the ecosystem services they addressed 
through the retirement and reforesting of substantial areas, 
with outcomes including reductions in soil erosion and 
improvements in carbon sequestration capacities (Liu et al., 
2008; Bennet, 2008). However, non-native species were 
planted, thus affecting native biodiversity (Liu et al., 2008). 
Studies have also suggested that both programmes may have 
the potential for ‘leakage’. This refers  to a situation where 
securing an ecosystem service in one location leads to the loss 
or degradation of ecosystem services elsewhere (OECD, 2010).  
For example, while Chinese timber production decreased after 
the programmes were established, timber imports increased in 
several years, potentially indicating ‘leakage’ of timber 
production from China to timber exporting countries, such as in 
the tropics (Liu et al., 2008). 
Pimampiro 
municipal 
watershed-
protection 
scheme 
Ecuador 2000 watershed water provision government-financed PES This was set up by the municipality of Pimampiro to protect the 
Palaurco River upper watershed, an area of 496 hectares that 
provides the inhabitants of the municipality with drinking water. 
A drought in 1999 and a newly built dam helped raise public 
awareness about the importance of the watershed. Included in 
the programme are the surrounding forests and grasslands of 
the right bank of the river, as they were increasingly converted 
to agricultural land. Landowners are paid for the maintenance 
or restoration of the original landscape and receive technical 
support as well as in-kind subsidies. The scheme is financed by a 
surcharge of water users, and interest from a water fund, as well 
as by the non-governmental organization Inter-American 
Foundation (Echavarría et al., 2004). The level of payments is 
designed to cover the opportunity costs of the landowners. 
Additionality in terms of water quality could not be well 
assessed, but in comparison with neighbouring areas, forest and 
grassland cover has increased strongly. However, agricultural 
profitability has also decreased during that time which may have 
contributed to lessening the impact of landuse (Wunder and 
Alban, 2008). 
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FONAG water 
fund 
Ecuador 2000 forest, valleys hydrological services user-financed PES This is the oldest example of PES schemes financing the 
protection of hydrological services of natural forests and valleys 
with the help of a trust fund. The fund is managed by an 
independent advisory board who chooses the areas to be 
restored within the 500,000 hectares area around Quito. The 
fund is financed by water users through the water utility 
company and used for restoration and training activities, often 
in the framework of community projects. The water fund 
appears to have successfully re-vegetated and reforested the 
area under control and stopped or reduced threatening 
agricultural practices such as cattle grazing while those continue 
in comparable areas (Buytaert et al., 2006).  
Payments for 
Hydrological 
Environmental 
Services (PSAH) 
Mexico 2003 forest hydrological services government-financed PES The Payments for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) 
was launched in Mexico in 2003. In order to decrease the 
growing water scarcity the state forest agency CONAFOR pays 
communities and landowners in national priority areas, in total 
600,000 ha, for forest conservation. Cash payments are 
designed as to cover the opportunity costs of the farmers. 
However, similar to the PSA in Costa Rica, the programme 
appears to have low additionality as it targets low-threat areas  
because payments were decided to be distributed equally across 
the country. (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008) 
Los Negros 
Payments for 
ecosystem 
services 
Bolivia 2003 watershed water provision, 
biodiversity 
user-financed PES The declining forest cover and increasing water scarcity lead to 
conflict among water users in the watershed of the Los Negros 
Valley, which includes a cloud-forest, an important habitat for 
biodiversity, threatened by land conversion. The PES scheme 
covered 2774 hectares by August 2007 (Asquit et al., 2008). 
Upstream landowners receive in-kind-payments and technical 
assistance. The scheme contains six different payment types but 
the price is too low to engender real change (Wunder et al., 
2008). In addition, mistrust between buyers and providers 
weakened the success of the programme. Non-threatened areas 
became protected under the programme, because farmers were 
able to select the areas to protect which they would not have 
cleared anyway (Asquit et al., 2008).  
Northeim model 
project for 
agrobiodiversity  
Germany 2004 grassland biodiversity, recreation hybrid PES, tendering This is another example of where payments from a private 
foundation to farmers are set flexibly by forms of tendering. The 
project area covers 288 hectares that provides habitat for rich 
biodiversity, including threatened plant species. Environmental 
additionality may be high as the land-use intensity of 
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participating farmers is reduced and 159 fields of grassland were 
generated (Bertke and Marggraf, 2004).  
Wimmera 
catchment 
groundwater 
salinity control 
pilot programme  
Australia 2005 watershed hydrological services/ 
salinity control 
government-financed 
PES, inverse auctions 
This is an example of payments set flexibly by forms of tendering. 
The clearing of the natural landscape and use as grazing areas 
has distorted the salinity balance of the groundwater in the 
catchment area. Landowners in the upper Wimmera catchment, 
an area of 28,000 hectares, were paid by the Australian 
government to reduce the impact of their land-use. Payments 
were allocated by an inverse auction during which landowners 
offered a price for providing salinity reduction. The Catchment 
Management Authority (CMA) then chose participants who 
offered one expected unit of salt reduction for the lowest price. 
Although environmental additionality was designed to be high, 
there is no proof for the overall scheme’s actual effectiveness 
(Shelton and Whitten, 2005).  
European Union 
Emissions Tradion 
Scheme (EU ETS) 
EU 2005 emissions greenhouse gas 
sequestration 
user-financed PES, 
auction 
This is probably the most popular example of user-financed PES. 
In carbon markets, carbon sequestration services are assigned a 
market exchange value to make them comparable with emission 
reductions. The price depends on the cost for emission 
reductions. In comparison to other PES schemes, a carbon 
market is highly abstracted from ecosystem services (Kosoy and 
Corbera, 2010). The EU ETS covers 45% of all EU emissions. More 
than 11,000 power and industrial plants and airlines have to buy 
emission allowances for the amount they emitted in the 
previous year. During the current trading period, 2013-2020, 
57% of all available allowances are allocated by an auction. The 
allowances are reduced every year (EC, 2016). More than 80 % 
of the revenues from the auction are planned to be used for 
climate related projects (EC, 2017). However, an excessive 
oversupply of emission allowances in the scheme makes the 
system ineffective as an incentive for companies to invest in 
strategic emissions saving. In order to control for this surplus, 
the market stability reserve is planned to reduce the available 
allowances from 2019 on (EC, 2016). 
Slug it out UK 2015 watershed/aquifer water provision user-financed PES The programme was introduced to farmers in six small priority 
areas, over a total 7,500 hectares (Anglian Water, 2017), to 
avoid a certain pesticide (metaldehyde) and comply with the EU 
water directive. Farmers receive payments to cover the cost of 
substituting the pesticide with an alternative as well as bonuses 
for successfully reducing the contamination of the ground 
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water. In some of the catchments, the contamination was 
successfully reduced below the threshold required by the 
directive. Additionally, some farmers decided to change practice 
on all their land, doubling the size of the impact area. However, 
in some areas, where multiple uses took place, the impact of the 
programme is less clear (Anglian Water, 2015).  
Cost-benefit analysis integration 
Bala dam 
proposal 
Bolivia 1999 watershed biodiversity, habitat, 
greenhouse gas 
sequestration, recreation, 
existence value 
CBA, benefit transfer The construction of the power generating Bala dam was initially 
proposed in the late 1990s. The Conservation Strategy Fund (an 
international NGO) conducted a CBA including social and 
environmental impacts of the project, the latter being valued 
using benefit transfer. In the course of the construction work 
more than 200,000 hectares with globally important high 
biodiversity would have been flooded. Using a low- and high-
cost scenario, the analysis came to the result that the project 
would cause a net financial loss of more than 400 million US 
dollars. The project was cancelled (Reid, 1999). 
Thornton Creek 
Confluence 
Improvement 
project  
USA 2014 watershed biodiversity, habitat, 
water provision, flood 
control 
CBA, benefit transfer For this project, a CBA was conducted in order to identify the 
best management option of the Thornton Creek watershed in 
Seattle, USA, which is an area affected by frequent storm water 
flooding. The watershed provides water for a 12-square-mile 
region with relatively high biodiversity for an urban region, 
including a threatened salmon species. Seattle Public Utilities 
engaged economists from Earth Economics (a Non-
Governmental Organisation) to conduct a CBA to work out 
whether to replace a water-absorbing metal pipe by a 
confluence floodplain. Using their Ecosystem Service Valuation 
Toolkit, the scientific team extrapolated primary valuations to 
the ecosystem services in the Thornton Creek watershed and 
examined the confluence floodplain to provide the most 
economic, social and environmental benefits. Building the 
confluence floodplain was agreed in 2014 (Schmidt and Wittich, 
2014). 
Belize Integrated 
Coastal Zone 
Management Plan 
Belize 2015 coastal area biodiversity, habitat, 
recreation 
CBA, modelling ESS values This coastal management plan was developed using a spatial 
model analysis. With a risk assessment examining threats the 
ecosystem services face and by modelling different 
management scenarios, a balanced plan emerged that 
combined protection of coastal ecosystems with safeguarding 
its economic benefits. The respective model scenario suggested 
that the revenues from lobster fishing and tourism would 
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increase. The plan is implemented by the Coastal Zone 
Management Authority and Institute (CZMAI, 2016; Arkema at 
el., 2015). 
Compensation payments 
Exxon Valdez oil 
spill 
USA 1989 coastal area biodiversity, habitat, 
recreation 
contingent valuation The most famous oil spill cases is that of an Exxon Valdez tanker 
in 1989 that severely distorted the ecosystem on the coast of 
Alaska. It had been the largest oil spill in US history up to that 
point (Navrud and Pruckner, 1997). The state of Alaska 
conducted a contingent valuation study to assess the damage 
value in terms of what people would pay to avoid a similar 
catastrophe. The final sum of damage payments did not deviate 
much from the actual value proposed by the study. Exxon Valdez 
had to pay 1 billion US dollars for restitution and resource 
damage to the state of Alaska and the US government. In 
addition, Exxon Valdez spent more than 2 billion for the 
restoration of the area (Carson et al., 2003). 
Prestige Oil spill Spain 2002 coastal area biodiversity, habitat, 
recreation  
contingent valuation, 
passive use value  
During this oil spill, over 1,500 km of shoreline and ecosystems 
were severely damaged, including in France and Portugal. It is 
recognised as one of the largest environmental catastrophes in 
Spanish history. With economic and contingent valuations, the 
total economic value of the loss through the oil spill was 
calculated to be 4.3 billion Euro. The amount also served as a 
reference point for courts to claim compensation payments 
(Loureiro et al., 2009). In 2016, after years of negotiations, the 
highest Spanish court agreed a much lower payment (1 billion 
Euro) but obliged the insurance company of the tanker that 
caused the oil spill to compensate for all damages. This was the 
first court decision in Spain considering passive use values (Von 
Bertrab et al., 2016). Passive use values derive from the non-use 
of an ecosystem such as the value associated with its existence.   
Chevron Texaco 
pollution 
Ecuador 2011 Amazonas Forest biodiversity, habitat, 
recreation 
variety of environmental 
damage valuation studies/ 
court decision for damage 
restoration 
In the case of the pollution of the Amazonas forest by Chevron-
Texaco in Ecuador, a variety of valuation studies were conducted 
to determine the amount of the penalty payment to be made. In 
2011, the court ordered Chevron-Texaco to pay almost 9 billion 
US dollars which were used to restore the environmental 
damage and to build up cultural and health programmes for the 
affected communities (Kallis et al., 2013). The payment did not 
represent the full value of the ecosystem losses and deaths but 
could nevertheless be used to partly restore the damage as well 
15 
 
as to serve as a deterrent (Martinez-Alier, 2011; Kallis et al., 
2013). 
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 1 
Discussion 2 
The case studies cover a variety of methods for the valuation of ecosystem services. Explicit 3 
valuation studies were undertaken for damage compensation payments, some even included 4 
passive use values which are measured by people’s willingness to pay to prevent further 5 
environmental catastrophes (von Bertrab et al., 2016). Some studies used benefit transfer and 6 
extrapolated valuations of other ecosystems, such as the cost-benefit analyses (Schmidt and 7 
Wittich, 2014; Reid, 1999). The PES schemes valued ecosystem services either through 8 
flexible market interactions such as tendering where landowners offer the provision of certain 9 
ecosystem services for a certain price (Shelton and Whitten, 2005). Other PES set the 10 
payments for ecosystem service providers by approximating their opportunity costs and 11 
designing uniform payments based on this (Pagiola, 2008) or differentiating payment schemes 12 
(Asquit et al., 2008).  13 
 14 
Here we analyse the case studies against the three criteria of scale of change, threat and 15 
uniqueness.  16 
 17 
Scale of change  18 
The case studies cover a wide range of spatial scales, from 288 hectares to 21 million hectares 19 
(Bertke & Marggrad, 2004; Liu et al., 2008). The median spatial scale is 28,000 hectares. 20 
 21 
Those valuation studies covering only one region that is neither threatened by a threshold nor 22 
weakly substitutable are appropriate for ecosystem service valuation. To assess whether the 23 
ecosystems under consideration were appropriate to be valued, the case studies are 24 
categorized in terms of regions or ecosystems covered. Applied to PES schemes, 25 
undifferentiated payments are counted as large-scale valuations, whereas payment contracts 26 
made individually for every farm are regarded as local valuations. In the sample, some studies 27 
valued one certain ecosystem or similar ecosystems in one region, i.e. the region surrounding 28 
a watershed or catchment area (Schmidt & Wittich, 2014; Wunder & Alban, 2008; Asquit et 29 
al., 2008), while others valued different types of ecosystems simultaneously. 30 
 31 
The most prominent example where aggregated valuations were made at a uniform price is 32 
the EU ETS. Auctions under the EU ETS are generally uniform price auctions and allocate 33 
large amounts of allowances for the same market clearing price. For example, on September 34 
14, 2017, a total 5,329,500 allowances were auctioned (European Energy Exchange AG, 35 
September 15, 2017). As already highlighted, the EU ETS has been ineffective in encouraging 36 
companies to make strategic investments for large scale emissions reductions. The damages 37 
evaluated in the course of claiming compensation payments in the cases analysed are also 38 
examples for aggregated valuation. The damage caused by the Prestige oil spill was evaluated 39 
by aggregating the losses of the whole area, including shorelines of three countries (Loureiro 40 
et al., 2009). In the framework of the PSA in Costa Rica the usage of uniform payments for 41 
participating landowners lead to one of the shortcomings of the programme (Pagiola, 2008). 42 
The payments were too low to induce owners of threatened areas to cease their land-use.  43 
 44 
In contrast, the inverse auctions undertaken in the framework of the Wimmera catchment 45 
programme and the Northeim model project resulted in individual payment contracts (Shelton 46 
& Whitten, 2005; Bertke & Marggraf, 2004). PROFAFOR, as well as the payments under the 47 
PES in the Vittel catchment area, are agreed individually (Wunder & Alban, 2008; Perrot-48 
Maître, 2006). The CBAs discussed evaluate ecosystem services at a rather local scale. For 49 
the spatial plan of the Belizean coastal zone benefits were modelled separately for each of 50 
the nine planning regions (Arkema et al., 2015).  51 
 52 
Some PES schemes do not offer individually set payments but differentiated payments 53 
depending on the quality of the conserved area. Farmers receive higher payments for the 54 
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preservation of original biodiversity or more important landscapes, such as in the PES 1 
schemes for certain watersheds (Wunder & Alban, 2008; Asquit et al., 2008) and in the 2 
schemes in China and the GTGP and NFCP in the UK (Liu et al., 2008; Dobbs & Pretty, 2008). 3 
In the above case studies there is some emergent evidence that supports the assertion that 4 
ecosystem service valuation should only be used at a local level if it is to be effective. For most 5 
case studies, the scale of change valued cannot be identified with certainty. This relates to the 6 
inherent problem of valuation which is the identification of marginal changes (Turner et al., 7 
2003). However, most of the projects offer regionally differentiated valuations, but only few of 8 
them include individual valuations on the local level. 9 
 10 
Threat 11 
For all case studies justification can be found that the ecosystem monetised is somehow 12 
threatened, or that it comes close to its critical threshold (Farley, 2008), except in the case of 13 
the PES of PROFAFOR for which no information about the state of the ecosystem is given 14 
(Wunder & Alban, 2009). In the case of compensation payments, the evaluated damage 15 
degraded the ecosystems substantially and brought them close to this threshold or even 16 
beyond it. The discussed CBAs compare different management options with regard to several 17 
objectives, including the reduction of threats to which ecosystems are exposed.  18 
 19 
However, it is possible to nuance the kind of threat to which respective ecosystems are 20 
exposed. In some cases this includes direct and recent disturbances, such as regular floods 21 
in the Thornton Creek watershed or China (Schmidt & Wittich, 2014; Liu et al., 2008).  22 
Additionally, endangered ecosystems or endangered species situated in the respective areas 23 
covered by the scheme would have been likely degraded without the implementation of certain 24 
conservation measures. Examples include the Belize Barrier Reef which was recently added 25 
to the list of World Heritage Sites in Danger; or the Chinook salmon in the Thornton Creek 26 
watershed (Schmidt & Wittich, 2014).  27 
 28 
In cases such as in the UK, where historic landscapes have been increasingly changed and 29 
adjusted to modern agricultural land-use over the last decades (Dobbs & Pretty, 2008), there 30 
is no indication that this development urgently threatens their existence. In other cases, 31 
projects had been initiated to address threatened areas but the payments offered appeared to 32 
be too low for inducing landowners to participate and to stop their land-use, such as in the 33 
case of Los Negros in Bolivia (Pagiola, 2008; Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008).  34 
 35 
With this nuanced perspective, our sample consists of 15 studies where the provision of the 36 
respective ecosystem service is threatened; and six where the ecosystem is in a state further 37 
from the threshold, but with a tendency of moving towards it before the start of its valuation. 38 
What can be seen is that more often than not, ecosystem service valuation is used to protect 39 
threatened species, although often these schemes also include other safeguards. In the case 40 
of compensation payments, the scheme is not used for prevention of damage and therefore 41 
should be treated separately within the context of ‘threat’.  42 
 43 
Uniqueness   44 
It is difficult to define the uniqueness of an ecosystem. However, it is possible to approximate 45 
the global role an ecosystem plays through arguments for its weak substitutability. Some of 46 
the ecosystems covered by the valuation projects are very rare, such as coral reefs at the 47 
coast of Belize, or serve as habitat for endangered species, such as the Chinook salmon in 48 
the Thornton Creek watershed (Arkema et al., 2015; Schmidt & Wittich, 2014).  49 
 50 
In addition, some ecosystems are of global importance owing to their capacity of providing a 51 
certain, globally important service, such as the Amazon forest, which plays a key role for the 52 
global climate due to its enormous gas sequestration capacities (Flannery, 2005). The sample 53 
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contains one valuation referring to the Amazon forest, referring to its pollution by Chevron 1 
Texaco (Martinez-Alier, 2011).  2 
 3 
Assessing conditions for monetisation  4 
Based on the categories of scale, threat and uniqueness, it is possible to assign the case 5 
studies to the three regions outlined by Farley (2008) or that by Turner et al. (2003) and seen 6 
in Fig. 1. If an ecosystem covers either a massive scale or is globally unique, both make it 7 
globally important. Equally, if it is very close to a threshold beyond which it can no longer 8 
sustain itself, the ecosystem is too critical to be assigned to a stable and meaningful value 9 
(Farley, 2008).  10 
 11 
According to the framework presented in this paper, monetisation or valuation should only 12 
cover ecosystems that are in a noncritical state and are able to provide abundant ecosystem 13 
services. Ecosystems in this first region are not threatened, not unique and not of a globally 14 
important scale. If an ecosystem only meets one or two of these criteria, some kind of 15 
quantitative limit has to be applied in order to safeguard the sustainable minimum standard of 16 
the ecosystem or ecosystem service (Farley, 2008). These ecosystems represent the middle 17 
region (Region II). The cases that fulfil none of the criteria would be assigned to the region 18 
where valuation is impossible (Region III), as their value is infinite and their restoration or 19 
conservation is critical (Farley, 2008).  20 
 21 
From the presented case studies, a few do fall into the region which are regionally specific, 22 
non-unique and non-threatened and therefore a monetisation through ecosystem service 23 
valuation may be appropriate. For example, the GTGP and the NFCP in the UK can be 24 
assigned to the region where valuation is appropriate without restrictions, because the areas 25 
are not urgently threatened and the payments are at least differentiated depending on the 26 
country (Dobbs and Pretty, 2008).  27 
 28 
However, monetisation has also been applied to threatened ecosystems, such as the coral 29 
reefs within the Coastal Zone of Belize (Arkema et al., 2015), as well as to the watersheds 30 
and catchment areas, or non-local ecosystems such as the EU ETS (EC, 2016). Therefore, 31 
their valuation should have been complemented with some other form of restrictions (Farley, 32 
2008). Even though valuation without a minimum standard should not have been used in the 33 
middle region (Region II), in some, rather small scale projects, it appeared to have generated 34 
environmental additionality (Perrot-Maître, 2006; Wunder & Alban, 2008).  35 
 36 
Ecosystem services valued for compensation payments would all fall into the left region 37 
(Region III) of Fig. 1 because of their enormous scale and the severe impacts of their 38 
degradation making them impossible to be valued meaningfully.  However, as Kallis et al. 39 
(2013) note, compensation payments may achieve additionality, if they are used to restore 40 
environmental damages and if the risk of being charged a penalty fee deters companies from 41 
polluting the environment.  42 
 43 
Although financial practice contradicts theory when a range of valuation schemes are applied 44 
to threatened ecosystems, some of them are embedded in a broader political strategy which 45 
indeed includes a kind of quantitative control element like a minimum standard, which Farley 46 
(2008) would suggest for the threatened ecosystem in the middle region (Region II). For 47 
example, both the PSAH in Mexico and the PSA in Costa Rica were implemented at the same 48 
time as a logging ban (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Pagiola, 2008). Furthermore, the “Slug it out” 49 
project was introduced in order to comply with the drinking water directive that restricts the 50 
concentration of pesticides in water (Anglian Water, 2015).  51 
 52 
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To assess whether a programme was effective in terms of protecting the addressed 1 
ecosystem is not straightforward for two reasons. Firstly, defining a counterfactual is 2 
problematic. Most of the assessments did not define counterfactuals but compared the 3 
developments of the respective areas with neighbouring areas (Wunder & Alban, 2008). 4 
Linked to the need for a counterfactual, measuring effectiveness implies the need to measure 5 
additionality. Our case studies show that very few programmes have incorporated a detailed 6 
and systematic effort to formally quantify additionality, especially ex ante (Wunder & Alban, 7 
2008). Secondly, the relatively recent implementation of these programmes makes it difficult 8 
to properly assess their long-term effectiveness, as this would require a longer time horizon 9 
(Dobbs & Pretty, 2008, Liu et al., 2008). With some contracts still ongoing, it is unclear what 10 
will happen when they eventually end and whether conservation or restoration will continue 11 
after payments stop (Wunder & Alban, 2008; Bennet, 2008).  12 
 13 
Based on these findings we would like to propose certain directions for future research. New 14 
techniques need to be developed and incorporated in current valuation methodologies in order 15 
to assess their effectiveness. These techniques need to focus both on the short and long-term 16 
impacts on the ecosystem and the relevant wider socio-economic system taking into 17 
consideration critical issues such as additionality and equality (Kallis et al., 2013). 18 
Furthermore, in several of the case studies examined in this paper it was impossible to assess 19 
their effect separately from other factors which may have influenced the effectiveness, such 20 
as other political instruments implemented at the same time (Pagiola, 2008) or other market 21 
mechanisms (Wunder & Alban, 2008).  22 
Conclusions  23 
This paper explored the type and effectiveness of different ecosystem service valuations as 24 
applied in practice through the use of case studies. These were compared against the 25 
theoretical understanding as outlined by Farley (2008) and Turner et al. (2003). In particular 26 
the three conditions of scale, uniqueness and threat were identified as conditions which could 27 
indicate the appropriateness of application of monetisation towards ecosystem services. 28 
Monetisation should only be used as a standalone valuation method when ecosystems are at 29 
local scale, non-unique and are not threatened. If one or two of these conditions are not met, 30 
then additional measures to protect the ecosystem should be implemented such as minimum 31 
standards or further policy protection. If none of the conditions are met, ecosystem valuation 32 
is inappropriate.  33 
 34 
In practice, the majority of the case studies include ecosystems that do not meet all three 35 
conditions. However, the case studies do also include additional measures to protect the 36 
underlying ecosystem. Therefore, determining the effectiveness of the particular 37 
implementation of monetisation or valuation is difficult as outcomes can be attributed to both 38 
the implementation as well as the additional policy measures. Indeed, in some cases the 39 
outcomes of the entire intervention are uncertain. The absence of ecosystem assessments 40 
prior to the launch of a valuation service or the absence of counterfactual information also 41 
makes it difficult to evaluate impact. However, evidence does exist that some practice has 42 
resulted in higher quality ecosystems, in particular in watershed management.  43 
 44 
Besides the problem of measuring effectiveness, uncertainty with regard to how close an 45 
ecosystem is to its threshold, or even the existence of the threshold, makes the categorisation 46 
of when valuation is appropriate highly uncertain (Farley, 2012). Leopold (1993) argues that 47 
as we do not know with certainty which parts of the ecosystem are essential, it is straight 48 
forward to treat everything as critical.  49 
 50 
We note that while the framework we propose in this paper rules out ecosystem valuation 51 
when the conditions mentioned above are not met, monetisation can inform policy-makers of 52 
values they would have not otherwise considered and thus making them more likely to protect 53 
ecosystem services. In some cases, when the costs of, for example, protecting an endangered 54 
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species, clearly outweigh the benefits of this protection, but in which counterfactuals cannot 1 
be assessed, protection of the ecosystem services, regardless of monetary values, could be 2 
considered the actual counterfactual. However, in this case the decision to protect or not 3 
protect the ecosystem service should not be based purely on a valuation of the costs and 4 
benefits.  5 
 6 
While some evidence exists that valuation can be effective in certain circumstances, this has 7 
rarely been the case in practice without additional policy measures to protect threatened 8 
ecosystems. Given this conclusion, we recommend that the current drive to rapidly expand 9 
valuation services and ecosystem evaluation, in particular through voluntary private sector 10 
measures, is highly risky and should be considered with much greater care. At the very least, 11 
full and thorough evaluations of their effectiveness need to be captured and shared so that 12 
lessons can be learnt and further refinements of such services can be made.  13 
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